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Imagination
What is the imagination? In a famous passage of “Imagination and 
Perception” Peter Strawson writes: 
The uses, and applications, of the terms ‘image’, ‘imagine’, ‘imagina-
tion’, and so forth make up a very diverse and scattered family. Even 
this image of a family seems too definite. It would be a matter of more 
than difficulty to identify and list the family’s members, let alone their 
relations of parenthood and cousinhood. (Strawson 1970: 31) 
Similarly, in his Mimesis as Make-Believe, the most influential book-
length discussion on the imagination, Kendal Walton recognizes that 
the term ‘imagination’ has a use that is too broad to allow for one 
single characterization. Walton elaborates on several paradigmatic 
examples of imaginative activities including daydreams, dreams, 
fantasies, games of make-believe and representational works of art. 
He makes a number of important distinctions between deliberate im-
aginings and spontaneous imagining (where the first are based on an 
agent’s decision to carry out a certain imaginative activity and the 
second emerge without effort or premeditation), between solitary 
imaginings and social imaginings (where the first are carried out by 
an individual alone and the second are produced collectively), and 
between occurrent imaginings and nonoccurrent imaginings (where 
only the first occupy a subject’s attention while the second are held 
by a subject who does not focus on them). But eventually he writes: 
What is it to imagine? We have examined a number of dimensions 
along which imaginings can vary; shouldn’t we now spell out what they 
have in common? – Yes, if we can. But I can’t. (Walton 1990: 19)
In this entry I will shrink the existent characterisations of the im-
agination into a systematic novel taxonomy coherent with standard 
treatments in cognitive science, aesthetics and philosophy of mind. 
Many cognitive scientists and philosophers recognize two main va-
rieties of imaginative abilities: the non-propositional imagination – im-
agining a tree – and the propositional imagination – imagining that 
there is a tree in the garden. Central to these accounts is the idea 
that mental acts have certain contents that can be thought in differ-
ent ways. The ways in which these contents can be thought are called 
propositional attitudes, when the relevant content is propositional, and 
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modes of presentations, when the relevant content is non-propositional. 
(The reader familiar with the Fregean tradition should not be puz-
zled by this terminology since the use of the term ‘modes of pres-
entation’ in this context does not coincide with the use of the term 
‘Sinn’ or ‘Sense’ in philosophy of language.) The basic assumption is 
that imagination can have the same contents as other mental states, 
such as belief, desire, perception, hallucinations and so on. What 
distinguishes imagination from other mental states is the attitude or 
the mode of presentation characterizing the way in which we think 
of these contents. So, for example, I can believe that there is a tree 
in front of me and I can imagine that there is a tree in front of me. 
Similarly, I can see the tree in front of me and I can imagine the tree 
in front of me. The difference between my believing that p and my 
seeing an object o on one side and my imagining that p and imagining 
o on the other is to be explained in terms of the ways in which I think 
of these contents. However, as we will see, such an explanation is not 
easily forthcoming. But before starting the discussion let me distin-
guish two main usages of the term ‘imagination’ that are still quite 
common but that should be put aside. 
First, the term ‘imagination’ is often used as a synonym for the 
term ‘creativity’. Yet, not all imaginative activities involve creativity 
and not all creative activities involve imagination. There is a notion 
of imagination that intersects creativity in that it shares with it one 
fundamental aspect, i.e. originality. Something is creative in some 
domain if it is genuinely original with respect to an established tra-
dition in that domain (Carroll 2003; Olsen 2003). So, the creative 
imagination is an ability to produce a novel output of any kind. A more 
specific notion can be obtained by adding a second criterion, i.e. 
value. As Kant (2000: §46) famously remarked, nonsense can often 
be quite original, yet this does not make it valuable. So, for exam-
ple, one might posit a novel question that nobody has ever posed be-
fore, which is valuable for, e.g., changing a traditional perspective on 
some issue or for enlightening a particular aspect of a problem. Gaut 
(2010: 151) further individuates a third criterion, what he calls “lair 
by the maker”. However, the concept of flair has never been really 
clear – Gaut himself does not articulate it – and while according to 
a certain tradition in aesthetics this is one of the hallmarks of artistic 
creativity, the creative imagination extends over and above the arts 
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to contribute to all areas in which it generates new and (possibly, but 
not necessarily) valuable representations. (For some contemporary 
work on creativity see, e.g., Boden 1992; Carruthers 2002, 2007; 
Kaufman and Paul 2014; Krausz et al. 2009; Sternberg 1999; and 
Weisberg 2006.)
Second, the term ‘imagination’ is often used as synonymous with 
‘false belief’ and ‘misperception’. So, for example, to say that a child 
imagines a shadow in the corridor to be a monster is to say that she 
misperceives the shadow as a monster. And to say that she imagines 
that a monster is moving in the corridor is to say that she falsely 
believes that a monster is moving in the corridor. Currie and Ra-
venscroft (2002: 9) forcefully reject the identification of imagination 
and false belief by remarking that these are two distinct capacities. 
As they write: “There isn’t a distinctive capacity to have beliefs that 
go wrong; there is a capacity to have beliefs, and that capacity can go 
wrong” (9). Similarly, one should reject the identification of imagi-
nation and misperception by noticing that there is no special capacity 
to misperceive reality: there is the capacity for perception, and that 
capacity can go wrong.
1 Non-propositional imagination
Non-propositional imagination can be thought of as a relation be-
tween a subject and a non-propositional content, which can be imag-
istic or non-imagistic. Imagistic imagination is often identified with 
imagery, which can be thought of as an ability to produce percep-
tion-like representations of things. Originally Aristotle described 
imagery – what he called phantasia – as “that [faculty] in virtue of 
which an image arises for us” (1995: iii.3.428aa1-2). He recognized 
the predominance of sight as the most developed among the senses 
and offered a pictographic notion of imagination as the faculty of vis-
ualizing or producing picture-like perceptions of things in the mind 
(iii.3.429a2-4). However, according to a broader characterization, 
imagery is an ability to produce perception-like representations of 
things in any sensory modality. So, for example, one can imagine a 
tiger by forming a visual image of it, but one can also imagine the 
sound of the ocean or the smell of an orange. Some argue that men-
tal images are analogues of non-mental images (e.g., Kosslyn 1980, 
1994; Kosslyn et al. 2006). However, no one in the contemporary 
debate on the nature of mental images claims that they are literally 
like pictures in the mind. So-called pictorialists suggest that mental 
images are picture-like only in the sense that they have intrinsically 
spatial representational properties similar to those of pictures. On 
the other hand, descriptivists claim that mental images are like lin-
guistic descriptions (e.g. Dennett 1969/1981, 1979; Pylyshyn 1973, 
1978, 2003). The debate has not yet reached any generally accepted 
resolution (cf. Kind 2005 for a review). 
Without any restriction the notion of imagery, and hence that 
of imagistic imagination, naturally extends to the entire representa-
tional power of the mind and hence to all thought. Aristotle claimed 
that “the soul never thinks without an image” (iii.7.431a17) and the 
British empiricists elaborated a similar view when they suggested 
that all thinking involves mental images – what they called “ideas”. 
Locke claimed that the term ‘idea’ stands for “whatsoever is the 
object of understanding when a man thinks” (2009: I.i.8). And in 
several places he seems to think of ideas as mental images, as when 
he writes: “thus it is with our ideas which are, as it were, the pic-
tures of things” (II.xxix.8). Hume 2011 characterised imagination as 
an ability to freely combine the ideas of things that we experienced 
in the past in thinking and reasoning. By ‘ideas’ he means the faint 
images of the sensory impressions of real objects acquired through 
perceptual experience (and of emotions and other mental states we 
experience through reflection). But since both impressions and ideas 
are images, differing only in their degree of vividness, imagery does 
extend from perception, to memory to all other mental states. This 
notion of imagistic imagination is clearly too broad. 
One common way to restrict the notion of imagery is to define it 
as an ability to produce perception-like representations of things in 
the absence of external stimuli. Thomas Aquinas describes the imagina-
tion as a creative activity forming “an image of something absent, 
or something perhaps never seen” (1922: I.85 ad 3). And Kant 1998 
introduces a similar notion, what he calls productive imagination, as 
“the faculty for representing an object even without its presence in 
intuition” (B151), where by ‘intuition’ one should understand percep-
tion. On this view, imagination is an ability to think of real objects 
(things, events or states of affairs) of the physical world that are not 
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presently perceived by creating new perception-like representations. 
So, for example, one might think of something one has never per-
ceived but whose existence one can infer from empirical evidence, 
such as the Big Bang. Without mentioning of the novel output this 
notion would also extend to cases of memory and more. But even if 
memory is excluded, cases of testimony and possibly other cases are 
not. For example, one might form a new mental image of an object 
one has never perceived through a causal chain of information going 
back to an individual’s first perception of that object (cf. Stevenson 
(2003: 240)). 
At the beginning of his Fourth Meditation Descartes famously dis-
tinguishes between the faculty of imagination as imagery and the 
faculty of reason or pure understanding, which can be non-imag-
istic (1996: 53). And in the Sixth Meditation he notices that while 
one might not be able to imagine (visually represent) a chiliagon (a 
thousand-sides polygon), one can understand its definition and use it 
in mathematical calculations (72 ff.). On this view imagery is identi-
cal to imagination, but imagination is just one subspecies of thought. 
Nevertheless, this notion of imagination is too broad and too narrow 
at the same time. It is too broad because it naturally extends to cases 
that we would not classify as cases of imagination. For example, it 
extends to cases of memory. Wherever we form a mental image, we 
have a case of imagery, and hence a case of imagination. But this no-
tion is also too narrow because it excludes cases that we would clas-
sify as cases of imagining. For example, Yablo (1993: 27 n 55) notices 
that, pace Descartes, we can imagine a chiliagon without forming a 
mental image of it. Yablo coins the term ‘objectual imagination’ and 
defines it as denoting a relation between a subject and a particular 
representation of a real or imaginary entity or situation, which does 
not require forming a mental image. So, one can endorse the original 
characterisation of imagery as an ability to form mental images in 
any sensory modality without identifying it with the notion of im-
agination. Some cases of imagery can be cases of non-propositional 
imagining, but not all of them will be. 
So, what would characterise non-propositional imagination? Gaut 
2003 advances the hypothesis that to imagine a certain object x “is 
a matter of entertaining the concept of x, where entertaining the 
concept of x is a matter of thinking of x without commitment to the 
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existence (or non-existence) of x” (273). Some cases of imagery will 
be cases of imagination if one is not committed to the existence of 
the imagined objects. We can form a mental image from memory, 
we can form a mental image in perception, and we can form mental 
images when dreaming, but by definition these cases are not cases 
of imagining. And yet even this definition is subject to counterex-
amples. Sometimes we do engage in imaginative activities involving 
objects to the existence of which we are committed. For example, 
when reading Orwell’s 1984 we imagine of London that it is the capi-
tal of a fascist state. In imagining this, we imagine about London, 
and we do that even if we are committed to the existence of London. 
The same considerations apply to our imaginative engagement with 
historical novels and other literary genres, such as New Journalism, 
where being committed to the existence of the protagonists of a cer-
tain story is fundamental for a correct understanding of the work.  
On a more radical approach, White (1991: 91-92) formulates four 
arguments to show that imagery is not a kind of imagination. First, 
he notices, imagination is under voluntary control, but imagery is 
not under voluntary control when it occurs in mental states such as 
dreams, memory, illusion and hallucination. Second, imagining is 
something that we do even when we imagine something involuntar-
ily, but having a mental image is not something that we do. Third, 
imagery can surprise us because it has an objectivity that imagination 
lacks: we establish the features of what we imagine. Fourth, imagery 
is particular and determinate while imagination can be general and 
indeterminate. Currie and Ravenscroft (2002: 24-27) reject each 
argument by pointing out that the same characteristics attributed 
to imagery can be attributed to certain episodes of imagining, and 
vice versa. First, they notice that just like some episodes of imagery 
are not under voluntary control, some episodes of imagining could 
be also involuntary. And while some episodes of imagery are invol-
untary, it does not follow that they could not be under voluntary 
control in some other context. Second, even if one agrees that imag-
inings are doings, it does not follow that they cannot be involuntary. 
And forming a mental image is something that we can do, whether 
voluntarily or involuntarily. Third, we can be surprised by features 
of what we imagine, as when one discovers that one is imagining 
that Sherlock Holmes has a full set of teeth without being previously 
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aware of it. Fourth, images are always partially indeterminate, as 
when I form a mental image of a tree without ascribing any particu-
lar number of leaves to it. And since mental images have a specific 
perception-like status, they are particular just like genuine percep-
tions are. Currie and Ravenscroft conclude that this only leads to the 
conclusion that there are two kinds of imagining: particular imagin-
ings and general imaginings. Forming mental images, i.e. visualising, 
they suggest, is a kind of particular imagining.
Before concluding this section let us briefly focus on the recently 
introduced notion of experiential imagination as an ability to think of 
oneself as if undergoing a certain perceptual experience of an object. 
Vendler 1979 introduces a specific notion of de se imagining that he 
calls subjective imagining as opposed to objective imagining. Subjective 
imagining would consist “in the representation of the experiences I 
would have if I were in some situation or another” or “what it would 
be like to be in a certain situation” (161). Objective imagining, on 
the other hand, would consist in forming a representation of one-
self from a certain perspective. For example, I can imagine myself 
swimming in the ocean subjectively, by representing the experience 
of feeling the cold temperature of the water, its salty taste, the cur-
rent and so forth. Or I can imagine myself swimming in the ocean 
objectively, by picturing myself in the water, as if I was watching 
myself swimming just like I could watch somebody else doing the 
same thing. 
Walton (1990: 28-35) introduces a notion of de se imagining that 
he characterizes as “imagining doing or experiencing something (or be-
ing a certain way) as opposed to imagining merely that one does or 
experiences something or possesses a certain property” (29, author’s 
original emphasis). For example, I can imagine that there is a tree in 
front of me (propositional imagination), I can imagine a tree (objec-
tual imagination), but I can also imagine seeing a tree in front of me 
(experiential imagination). According to Walton, the latter is always 
a case where one cannot fail to be aware of the fact that one is im-
agining about oneself. But the relevant notion of the self involved in 
this kind of imagining needs not be very thick. According to Walton, 
imagining de se is not a variety of de re imagining, as it would be for 
Lewis (1983: 156). Instead, it is a sort of “bare Cartesian I” (Wal-
ton (1990: 32)), which does figure in the content of the imagining. 
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Furthermore, such self-imaginings are crucial to an account of how 
we learn about our own feelings and our own selves and to an ac-
count of how we gain insight into others: “It is when I imagine myself 
in another’s shoes (…) that my imagination helps me to understand 
him. And when I imagine this I also learn about myself.” (34). In this 
way, Walton’s version of experiential imagination encompasses also 
what he calls quasi-emotion, i.e. imagining feeling in certain ways (see 
Meskin and Weinberg 2003 for criticisms). In his 1997 he relates this 
notion to simulation theory, which is a theory about how to under-
stand other people’s minds (e.g. mind-reading, empathy) by model-
ling their mental attitudes (e.g. emotions, but also beliefs, desires 
and more). I will come back to this at the end of the next section.
Finally, Martin (2002: 402 ff.) argues that all sensory imagin-
ing is imagining sensing, and in particular that visualizing is imagin-
ing seeing. In other words, sensory-like imaging an object involves, 
e.g., imagining seeing, hearing, touching the object rather than merely 
thinking about it. On this view, a mental state of imagining takes as 
its object another mental state, i.e. a sensory experience (see Pea-
cocke 1985 for a similar view). Currie and Ravenscroft (2002: 28) 
notice that in some circumstances we do mistake visualizing for gen-
uine seeing, but this is difficult to explain on the view that seeing and 
visualizing have different contents. Our limited capacity to discrimi-
nate between seeing and visualizing is much easier to explain if one 
recognizes that they do have the same contents.
2 Propositional imagination
Propositional imagination can be thought of as a relation between a 
subject and a propositional content. Roughly stated, propositional 
imagination can be characterized as an ability to recognize and re-
spond to non-actual scenarios, to ponder and evaluate different al-
ternatives, to make assumptions and infer certain consequences, to 
manipulate symbols and representations of a real or imaginary state 
of affairs. This notion of imagination has become central in contem-
porary inquiries into counterfactual reasoning and modal judgment. 
So, for example, Williamson 2005, 2007 suggests that imagination 
plays a central role in our abilities to predict what would happen (or 
what would have happened) if things had been different from the way 
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they actually are (or were). And Yablo 1993 argues that imagination 
(or conceivability) is the only serious basis for claims of metaphysical 
possibility (see Chalmers 1996, 2002, the contributions in Gendler 
and Hawthorne 2002, and Kripke 1980 for further discussion on the 
relation between conceivability and metaphysical possibility). But 
these accounts do not try to explain what the imagination is or con-
sists in. Rather, they assume a primitive notion of imagination (with-
out elucidating it) with the purpose of explaining other abilities.
Several contemporary theories of the propositional imagination 
have investigated its nature and its cognitive mechanisms by building 
on a quite natural comparison with belief. The central hypothesis is 
that belief and propositional imagination involve distinct but struc-
turally similar psychological mechanisms acting on similar proposi-
tional contents. In cognitive science this is called the single code hy-
pothesis for both imagining and belief (cf., e.g., Leslie 1987; Nichols 
2006b, 2004a; and Nichols and Stich 2000). The idea is that psycho-
logical mechanisms that can take inputs from imagining and from 
believing will process isomorphic inputs from both imagining and 
believing in very similar ways. In a nutshell, a psychological mecha-
nism taking inputs both from imagination and from belief should 
generate similar outputs.
So, for example, empirical evidence shows that the affective 
mechanisms taking inputs from imagining and from believing gen-
erate similar affective outputs (Lang 1984; and Harris 2000). For 
instance, in one study subjects were presented with an imaginary 
scenario involving an encounter with a snake where they showed 
physiological signs associated with fear (Lang et al., 1983). Simi-
larly, when we imaginatively engage with fiction we have affective 
responses that are similar to those we would have if we genuinely 
believed the propositional content of those imaginings. This phe-
nomenon, which is commonly called the paradox of iction, has been 
recently explained in terms of the single code hypothesis. To pity 
someone one has to know that he/she exists. Yet we pity Desdemona 
even though we know that she does not exist. This is easily explained 
once we consider that the affective mechanisms can take both belief 
inputs and imagining inputs to generate its affective outputs (Currie 
1997; Meskin and Weinberg 2003).
Similarly, the single code hypothesis would offer a solution to the 
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puzzle of imaginative resistance, the fact that even though, following 
an author’s prescription, we can imagine that, say, within a certain 
society people commit female infanticide, we could never imagine 
that this is morally right. Nichols (2006b: 463-464) explains this 
discrepancy by suggesting that this is probably due to the fact that 
the relevant input coming from imagination enters our moral re-
sponse mechanisms, and it is treated in the same way as any iso-
morphic input coming from belief. He also suggests that although 
imaginative resistance is usually restricted to cases involving moral 
and emotional features (cf. Moran 1994), we seem to have similar 
difficulties in imagining mathematical impossibilities, e.g. 2 ≠ 2, and 
that this might be explained by arguing that the relevant input from 
imagination enters our normal inferential mechanisms just like an 
isomorphic input from belief. Since we would normally reject the 
belief that 2 ≠ 2, so we would also reject the proposition that 2 ≠ 2 
from imagination. 
Belief and imagination typically share certain inferential mecha-
nisms. In particular, they share the inferential mechanisms of argu-
ment schemata. For example, if we believe that it is raining, and also 
believe that if it is raining the streets will be wet, we will infer that 
the streets will be wet (by modus ponens). Similarly, if we imagine 
that it is raining, and also imagine that if it is raining the streets 
will be wet, we will also infer that the streets will be wet. Usually 
the kind of inferences that we make depend on a background set of 
propositions – or background knowledge – but their operations depend 
on contingent facts that can vary from context to context. If I believe 
that the last train is leaving at 11:30 p.m., I might make different in-
ferences depending on whether my current interest is in going back 
home for the night or staying out with my friends. If my interest is in 
going back home, I might infer that I will need to be at the station by 
11:25 at the latest. Similarly, if I imagine that the last train is leaving 
at 11:30 p.m. and I also imagine that I want to be back home for the 
night, I will also infer that I will need to be at the station by 11:25. 
One major difference between belief and imagining consists in 
the fact that while we are not free to believe what we want, we our-
selves can usually determine what we imagine. To believe a certain 
proposition p is to hold p as true at the actual world, and whether the 
actual world makes p true or false is not up to us. On the contrary, 
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to imagine a certain proposition p is to hold p as true in some other 
possible (or even impossible) world, which is distinct from the actual 
world in some relevant aspect. Since which possible worlds would 
make p true is up to us, imagination does not have to conform to 
the actual world. Some imaginative practices, however, do impose 
certain constraints on what can or cannot be imagined. For exam-
ple, when generating a literary work of fiction the author builds a 
new fictional story upon some shared background knowledge of the 
actual world, and in this sense the actual world can constrain our 
imagining. 
Evans 1982 and Walton 1973, 1990 think of fictions as sophisti-
cated games of make-believe. Walton 1973 originally introduces a 
fundamental distinction between purely imaginative activities and 
the sort of imaginative activities involved in games of make-believe. 
When we engage in a purely imaginative activity we can imagine 
whatever we want. In fact, we can even decide not to draw cer-
tain inferences. But when we engage in a game of make-believe, our 
imagining is constrained by the actual world. Evans individuates a 
special incorporation principle to describe the sort of inferential mecha-
nisms at work within games of make-believe: “If B is true, and there 
is no set A1 … An of make-believe truths such that the counterfac-
tual ‘If A1 … An were true, B would not be true’ is true, then B is 
make-believedly true” (1982: 354). Basically, this principle permits 
the incorporation of any truth into the inferential mechanisms of 
make-believe, if this is not ruled out by the initial pretence. A clas-
sical example of a game of make-believe is the mud-pie game where 
children pretend that globs of mud are pies. Within this pretence, 
children make-believedly prepare, bake and cut pies. And when talk-
ing within this pretence they say things like ‘this pie has raisins in 
it’ when the glob of mud has pebbles in it, and ‘this pie is baking in 
the oven now’ when a glob of mud is in a black box that, within the 
pretence, is imagined to be an oven. By the incorporation principle, 
a child might infer that a pie is burnt if she has forgotten a glob of 
mud in the box for too long.  
This is compatible with the recognition that the facts that will be 
relevant to produce further inferences in imagination can be differ-
ent from those that might be relevant to produce further inferences 
in belief. Walton (1990: 174-ff.) notices that works of fiction often 
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shift our concerns in surprising ways, as when we do not even think 
of how Othello, “a Moorish general and hardly an intellectual”, could 
have talked in verse. And Nichols (464) notices that when we enjoy 
black comedy we have affective responses that we would not have if 
the facts and events represented in the fiction were taken to be real. 
He mentions the end of Kubrick’s Dr. Strangelove when all human life 
is about to be destroyed by the nuclear bomb. We find these events 
amusing in the context of the fiction, but surely we would not react 
in the same way if we were to take them as genuine facts about the 
imminent destruction of the entire human kind. 
Nichols (471) notices more inferential asymmetries between be-
lief and imagination when they combine with desires. He illustrates 
the point by considering two distinct scenarios. First, you are told 
that everyone outside is dead and then you are asked about what 
Utilitarianism would say about the importance of our interests. You 
believe the messenger. This belief elicits a permanent desire for the 
health of your family and friends and the combination of the newly 
acquired belief and this permanent desire of yours determines the in-
ference that they are also dead. You do not even think about answer-
ing the question. In the second scenario you are told to imagine that 
everyone outside is dead and then you are asked about what Utilitari-
anism would say about the importance of our interests. In this case 
you do not think about your beloved ones, you do not process any 
inference about their death, you simply try to figure out an answer 
to the question. Since according to this view desire takes imagining 
and belief as inputs, depending on the nature of the input one desire 
might be elicited while another might be shut down.
But can we say anything more about the nature of propositional 
imagination? According to one contemporary approach imagining 
that p is a matter of entertaining a certain proposition p, where ‘en-
tertaining p’ means having p in mind without any commitment to 
its truth or falsity, or supposing that such and such is the case without 
any alethic commitments (e.g., Denham (2000: 202-4); Gaut (2003: 
272); Lovibond (1983: 198); Plantinga (1974: 161-2); Scruton (1974: 
97-8); and Wolterstorff (1980: 233-4)). In contrast, believing that p 
involves a fundamental commitment to its truth. 
Walton (1990: 19-21) offers two main arguments against the 
identification of imagining and entertaining based on his distinction 
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between occurrent and non-occurrent mental events. Entertaining 
and the equivalent state referred to by expressions like ‘attending to’ 
and ‘considering’ are naturally construed as occurrent mental states. 
Walton’s first argument consists in noticing that an interpretation of 
the expression ‘nonoccurrently imagining that p’ in terms of nonoc-
currently entertaining p would allow much too much. There are too 
many propositions that we might nonoccurrently be aware of. For 
example, for many years one might have been nonoccurrently aware 
of the proposition that Saint Anselm was born in August, but this 
does not mean that one has nonoccurrently imagined that proposition 
for all that time. Restricting the notion of nonoccurrently entertain-
ing a proposition to cases of nonoccurrently imagining a proposi-
tion requires appealing to the notion of imagination itself. Walton’s 
second argument consists in noticing that the notion of entertaining 
a proposition cannot be used to characterise occurrent imagining 
either. If one imagines the negation of a proposition, one plausibly 
entertains both the proposition and its negation. In Walton’s words, 
“[o]ccurrent imagining, as we ordinarily understand it … involves 
more than just entertaining or considering or having in mind the 
propositions imagined” (20).
White (1990: 141-142) defines supposing and imagining as two 
distinct abilities, where to suppose that p is to put forward a hypoth-
esis, while to imagine that p is to conjure up a certain possibility. He 
makes three different considerations. First, he argues that two dif-
ferent kinds of reasons explain our inability to imagine that p and to 
suppose that p. When we say that one cannot imagine that p we refer 
to a certain inability to conjure up a certain possibility. When we say 
that one cannot suppose that p we refer to one’s lack of justification 
for committing oneself to a certain hypothesis. Second, one can fail 
or succeed in trying to imagine something, but one cannot fail or 
succeed in trying to suppose something. Third, when we ask some-
body to suppose that p we invite one to consider the implications or 
the consequences of p, while when we ask somebody to imagine that 
p we invite the audience to engage in a free imaginative activity. 
Gendler (2000: 80-81) presents an argument against the identifi-
cation of supposition and imagination by noticing that while we have 
no trouble in supposing morally deviant situations, we resist imagin-
ing them. For example, while we can suppose that female infanticide 
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is right, we resist imagining it. She argues that “[t]he source of this 
resistance can be traced to the way in which imagination requires a 
sort of participation that mere hypothetical reasoning does not” (80). 
Similarly, Moran 1994 claims that cases of imaginative resistance 
consist in “rejecting a point of view, refusing to enter into it” (105). 
However, while Gendler thinks that imagination and supposition 
are two distinct abilities, Moran distinguishes between two sorts of 
imaginative activities: hypothetical imagining and dramatic imagining. 
The first, which consists in imagining the truth of a proposition, is 
identical to supposition, which is now conceptualised as a sub-variety 
of the broader notion of imagination. The second, instead, requires 
a sort of “dramatic rehearsal” of emotions and feelings. As Moran 
writes: “imagination with respect to the cruel, the embarrassing, 
or the arousing involves something more like a point of view, a total 
perspective on the situation, rather than just the truth of a specifiable 
proposition” (105). 
In conclusion, I will mention that Currie and Ravenscroft 2002 
offer a further solution to the problem of imaginative resistance by 
recognizing a specific notion of imagination encompassing a vari-
ety of propositional imaginings over and above mere hypothetical 
thinking. This, which they call the recreative imagination, can be char-
acterized as an ability to think about the world from a perspective 
that is different from the one that experience presents. This notion 
originates within simulation theory, which (as we anticipated above) 
is a theory about how to understand other people’s minds by model-
ling their mental attitudes. (Among upholders of simulation theory 
are, e.g., Gordon and Barker 1994, Currie 1995b, and Harris 2000. 
Among their critics are, most prominently, Leslie 1987, and Nich-
ols and Stich 2000). So, for example, one might obtain an insight 
into what other people will do by imagining the things they believe 
and then seeing what, within that imaginative process, one might 
be inclined to decide (Gordon 1986). Naturally we can imagine not 
only what other people believe, but also what they desire, what they 
feel, what they hope for, what they fear etc. So, upholders of this 
theoretical framework argue that we should recognize the existence 
of a number of imaginative counterparts of several mental states, 
including those that do not necessarily take propositions as their ob-
jects. In this way, simulation theory enriches the architecture of the 
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imagination with a number of new mental states, including desire-
like imagining (Currie 1995a,b, 2002, 2010; Currie and Ravenscroft 
2002; Doggett and Egan 2007, 2011) and emotion-like imagining 
(Doggett and Egan 2012), but possibly more. Currie and Ravenscroft 
argue that supposition is identical to one sort of imagining having 
belief as its counterpart – or belief-like imagining. And they explain 
our resistance to deviant alien moralities by appealing to desire-like 
imaginings. This proposal has generated a rich and interesting debate 
in recent years, but it is still very controversial (Nichols and Stich 
2000; Nichols 2004b; Carruthers 2003; and Kind 2011).1
Fiora Salis
Centro de Filosofia, Universidade de Lisboa, Faculdade de Letras
Alameda da Universidade, 1600-214 Lisboa, Portugal
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